FIFAs Proposed Cap on Agent Fees will Lead to Conflict – Where Football Possibly Loses

There are alternatives that benefit the majority, if only people opened their eyes, ears and minds.

Having been invited to play a part (albeit small) in the consultation process with FIFA over the last 18+ months on the topic of regulating Football Agents, it has come to the point where I believe there is little or no intent from some at FIFA (and some stakeholders) to move away from their objective to try and implement some form of hard ‘cap’ on the commissions both earned and received (please note I separate those two terms) by football agents.

Whilst I applaud the seeming overarching endeavour of FIFA in addressing many of the concerns that surround the football agent industry, I fear that the seeming hard-line (if not ignorant) intent of some to drive through this issue will not only lead to lengthy and costly legal disputes but ultimately damage the industry over a prolonged period which is to the detriment of so many with an interest in football (not just FIFA and agents).

Whilst some in the agent industry have cited, they have not been properly consulted by FIFA (whether right or not), some at FIFA and amongst the football stakeholders are appearing increasingly disingenuous in their engagement with myself and others, and could be accused of ‘hearing but not listening’.

The notion of a cap on agent’s commissions I believe, does have some foundation in addressing the excesses of a few, however I do in the vast majority of cases believe it to be unfair, if not illegal.

Yet neither ‘side’ in this can in my opinion claim the moral high-ground ……. but the approach of FIFA in ‘ploughing on’ regardless of the concerns and objections mooted by many over the proposed cap, and the ‘harder-line’ agent groups categorically rejecting the ‘cap’ with no meaningful alternatives being presented is infuriating for those caught in the middle. To quote my late grandmother ‘you just want to bang their heads together’.

In the period where new regulations and a cap have been presented by FIFA, consultation undertaken (or not, as your argument may be) and numerous drafts presented, I have proposed various alternatives to a cap, if only to avoid sacrificing some of the much-needed reforms and regulations that FIFA have put forward. As such the purpose of this article/document is to put some of those ideas in the public domain, if only to demonstrate there are alternatives to a ‘hard cap’ and to promote more debate and also ideas from others.


1.      Removal of Allowance for Duality (triality etc)

PROPOSAL

This is probably the simplest and most viable alternative to a ‘cap’ on football agent fees, granted the proposal doesn’t please all parties but is a ‘middle ground‘ for the two opposing views. It not only addresses limiting the more excessive examples of football agent’s fees, but also addresses clear conflicts of interests in the football transfer market, protect those who need more protection and reduces agent influence in the transfer market.

The law of agency is (as I understand it) enshrined in law with such factors of fiduciary duty; and the easiest parallel to draw is that of the legal profession where a lawyer cannot represent both parties in the same duty due to a conflict of interest. It can also be demonstrated in other professions and industries whereby even if an agent is a facilitator in a transaction, they can only be paid by one party.

This also fits the stated intention of FIFA in implementing a ‘client pays model’ far better than the FIFA proposed cap that actually undermines a ‘client pays model’. By negating duality (and triality) it is clearer as to who is paying and for what; and yes, that could be skewed with some skulduggery but at least the skulduggery is more obvious to those involved and can possibly be addressed in the future.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

I know that many in the agent’s industry will react to this by saying it is wrong and why shouldn’t an agent be able to represent multiple parties (and get paid by multiple parties) in the same transaction (e.g., transfer).

The argument typically goes “well we helped the club get the player they wanted, and the player has received a pay rise and a very nice contract – so why shouldn’t I be paid by both”. However, if the club is operated well (not all are, with officials working with agents) they should be looking at getting the player for as little as they can and paying him within their budget, meanwhile the player will be looking to get the best pay they can and move to the club that best suits them and their situation (e.g., family).

So, if the player is only informed about one clubs offer (as the agent is being paid by that club well but not that of another club who also want the player) and moving to a country where his family will also have to be moved to (against their wishes); is the agent acting in the best interests of the player as the client. Also, if the player then is unhappy and doesn’t perform (with an unhappy homelife) is it in the best interests of the club, let alone the player?

On the face of it I appreciate and understand the argument from some in the agent industry in a totally pure form, that why shouldn’t they be able to act for multiple parties if the interests of all parties they represent are truly and fairly aligned.

But is football pure? are football agents pure? Is anyone truly pure (especially in business)? ………… I haven’t heard yet of the likes of the Dalai Lama becoming a football agent yet. I firmly believe there is always the possibility of some ‘skew’ in someone’s mindset (myself included) whereby they convince (consciously or subconsciously) themselves what they are doing is right when it may go against the best interests of someone (client) they purportedly represent.

I haven’t heard yet of the likes of the Dalai Lama
becoming a football agent yet

The likes of the primary agent’s association in England (The AFA) will be one of the first to object to this and laud how they challenged the FA (Football Association of England) on this and won that battle. But anyone who actually stands back and says in all honesty that everyone’s interests in a transaction are perfectly aligned and the payments and decisions are fair to all, then they are sadly misguided (despite whatever their true and initial aims were).

There are a lot of ‘lawyers’ (some who double as agents) who also argue for football agents to be able to represent multiple parties in a transaction, but surely that is in contradiction to the values of their primary profession as lawyers in not having conflicts of interests.

CONCLUSION

As I stated earlier the removal of duality/triality is again open to some skulduggery as malpractice, should it be implemented, and without a cap it could be argued that this could be exacerbated without the implementation of something like a cap. It could well result in high agent’s fees being paid by just one party in a transaction at a far higher rate, but this would still present greater transparency than a complicated mix-and-match approach of payments shared between parties. Arguably it would provide clarity to all involved as to who pays the agent and for what, clarity on aspects of fiduciary duty, and paints a clearer picture (whether fake or not) for the authorities (not just FIFA and football but also the tax and law enforcement).

The football authorities will probably argue it is difficult to get this ‘genie back in the bottle’, but if that is the case – is it any more difficult that imposing a cap?

I counter that argument and say that given the foundation for negating ‘conflicts of interest’, reducing excessive agents fees, reducing agent influence of transfers, reflecting standards in other industries (law, property letting etc) and also addressing the concerns of some tax authorities, this is a far easier thing to implement than a ‘cap’ on fees.

And whilst the implementation of such restrictions will be challenged, I truly believe that the laws and standards in many jurisdictions would support this model, and to a far greater extent than implementing a ‘cap’ legally.


2.      A levy on agent’s fees

PROPOSAL

A levy on the perceived excessive fees (and I do agree some are excessive) received by football agents is usually one of the first thoughts that many put forward, and this isn’t down to a lack of knowledge, as it is actually a very good idea for diverting some of the wealth in football (e.g., agents fees, player salaries, transfer fees) back to ‘grassroots’, football development and community football.

However, whilst addressing the issue of financial ‘redistribution’, does it really address the issue of bringing the excessive agents fees back under control? I would argue it wouldn’t, something that is agreed with by many agents, clubs, and even those within football organisations at FIFA. In fact, until other complimenting measures are put in place, it may just increase agents’ fees.

would a levy on football agent fees work?
or just increase agent fees, transfer fees and player salaries?

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The primary dismissal of this suggestion may surprise some as I don’t believe it will come from the agents, but more so the football authorities and possibly the clubs. In that by adding a levy on to agent’s fees it will not only increase agents’ fees but most likely result in transfer fees increasing and player wages increasing – and I am not going to argue with that point of view as it is a reasoned argument.

This is comparative with almost any other provision of goods and services in other industries and markets. If the cost of sourcing, delivery, supply and production goes up then almost inevitably the cost of the sale (and maintenance) increases to the consumer/client.

Another aspect that may be impacted upon by a levy on agent’s fees is that it may well limit the choice of representation, if not the availability of representation for those who may need it most (e.g., young players and clubs with limited budgets).

CONCLUSION

I do believe a levy on the most excessive agents fees could be applied in conjunction with other measures to control the excesses of some agent fees. However, my main support for such a levy comes from the perspective of providing another revenue stream supporting the ‘good causes’ of football, on the proviso that this is well spent and benefits worthy recipients.

One step could be applying such a levy just on those agents’ fees paid by clubs (who can arguably represent themselves) and/or those fees that are above a certain amount in any one transaction. Thus, not deterring players from seeking adequate representation to represent their best interests, when they need it most and to avoid possible exploitation by clubs. Plus, not penalising lower-level clubs (with a higher agent commission levy) whose budgets are already stretched without increases to transfer fees, player wages and subsequently agent fees.

It would also refocus some agents into doing their best for players they represent, after all isn’t that the role of the original football agent – to represent the best interests of players?

Would this increase transfers? Possibly, but only transfer fees for those clubs represented by agents? Likewise, would a levy on the higher agent commissions increase transfer fees? Again, very likely. It would for those clubs who seemingly have the resources to pay such high fees in the first place.


3.      Limit in Correlation to Player Salary

PROPOSAL

In aligning the agents commission more robustly to the salary of the player, may also be a possible means to ensuring the focus and activity of agents is aligned with others involved in a football transfer/transaction, and also go some way to tackle undeserved excesses of some agent commissions.

The value of a transfer is (or should be) irrevocably linked on the talent, ability and value of the player. Albeit, the value of the player to one club may be greater (or less) than to another club, as it is with any supply and demand scenario and the circumstances that may affect the club (as the buyer and seller of registration rights) at any one time.

Subsequently the value of the player in the case of a ‘successful’ transfer (or signing) should also be reflected in the players remuneration package, whether gross basic salary or in terms of bonuses, dependant on both the players potential, performances and the successes of the club.

Even in the case of a ‘free transfer/agent’, the player should still be remunerated appropriate to their perceived value by the engaging (signing) club as the employer, and somewhat driven by market forces (e.g., demand). Even to the extent that the players salary or bonuses may be enhanced given that the engaging/buying club has no transfer fee to pay (or a reduced fee to pay).

the one constant is (should be) the player’s salary
should irrevocably be linked to
the talent, ability and value of the player

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Arguably this proposal is in itself a ‘capping’ mechanism, and will thus generate similar resistance and objections to that of FIFAs proposed cap. However, I firmly believe it is a more reasoned implementation of such controls than the ‘cap’ proposed by FIFA and I far more viable argument and implementation in the form of a legal and social argument.

Yet the question remains as to where to set such limits on agent commissions and what proportion is assigned to the agents involved in a transaction. Yet in implementing such a system centred around the players gross basic salary and any other guaranteed financial rewards (sign-on, loyalty), a number of other considerations and variables need to be taken into account, including the number of participants in a transaction (e.g., club and player, 2 clubs and player, 1/2/3) and the number of agents involved in the transaction.

Another key concern in this approach is that it could be argued that in aligning the agent’s commissions to that of the player it could mean that the representatives/agents of other parties (agents) in the transaction are not totally aligned with their own clients. However, a counter to that argument is that (i) do all clubs really need an agent representing their interests? (ii) it should be down to the club to assess whether the agent is representing their best interests and (iii) if the agent to the club wants to maintain a good relationship to their club-client for being involved in future transactions, they will work in their best interests.

CONCLUSION

A fair assessment of a limit on agent commissions linked to the one perceived constant in a football transfer/transaction (the players remuneration) is I believe a fair approach. There can be no disputing that the talent and primary beneficiary of a transaction should be the player; as they are the talent, any other breakdown of the total remuneration whereby the player is not the primary beneficiary could arguably be considered exploitation, a breach of human rights or indeed even modern-day slavery.

One potential approach would be to limit the cumulative agent’s fees in a transaction to the equivalent of 48% of the guaranteed remuneration received by the player over the course of the contract/agreement; however, this does not need to be solely paid by the player (e.g., shared by parties involved, clubs and player).

Thus, if disputed in the proportions paid by the parties to a single or multiple agents, the maximum of 48% can be split 2 ways (e.g. 24% to both club and player) or 3 ways (e.g. 16% to 2 clubs and player). It would however be down to the participants to agree what proportion of any such maximum amount would be payable to the agents they have engaged the services of.

An added benefit to this approach is that the players interests are placed at the centre of the negotiation, thus refocussing the agent on the best interests of the player. Historically, it could be argued that the player is the party to whom agents are meant to represent and focus on, plus players are often the ones most in need of adequate representation.

It may also encourage clubs to undertake their own negotiations etc without the unnecessary need for engaging an agent and also encourage transactions to involve as few agents as possible, thus negating disruption to the transfer process (e.g., ‘hold up’ and ‘gatekeeper’ problems, as cited by FIFA).


4.      Split Licensing

PROPOSAL

Split licensing is a concept I have mentioned before to various people, at events and also in articles (along with the agent passport concept), and it was something I first proposed back in 2014/2015. Some may note this was at the time when FIFA ‘abandoned’ the old agent license and regulations, and introduced the calamitous concept of intermediaries and ‘Regulations on Working with Intermediaries’ (RWI).

Although those in a position of authority at the time to make positive change chose to ignore the idea (in fact some roundly mocked the concept), it is still very much something I believe could work to compliment the effective regulation of Football Agent Activity. Either used alone and/or in conjunction with other methods (some listed in this article). It could be a feasible alternative in bringing excessive agents fees back under control and far more viable than the cap approach FIFA is proposing.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

I can see no harm in split-licensing, and the fact that no one has ever been able to voice any criticism with an argument to back it up (as to why it wouldn’t be of benefit), makes me believe it has some credibility.

Yes, the implementation and maintenance of split-licensing for football agents may be harder work than a single tier licensing model. Yet even that argument doesn’t really have much credibility – (i) some of the other agent regulation methods they are proposing are far more complex with multiple facets (e.g., CPD, Clearing House), (ii) FIFA do (and have done for many years) operated multiple licenses for agents (match and player), and (iii) many National Associations operate their own multi-level ‘agent’ authorisation of which FIFA has to be aware.

Will it address the matter of excessive agent’s fees? In essence, no it wont on its own, however used in conjunction with others it may help address such concerns whilst also monitoring and recording such areas of concern better.

a boundary between agents who represent clubs
and those who represent players,

CONCLUSION

Whilst split-licensing won’t address the issues of excessive agents’ fees, it would provide clarity for monitoring agents activity and payments whilst also giving more control to FIFA over agent activity. All of which in turn may bring excessive payments more under control and such dealings will have more transparency in the role of agents.

In separating those agents who are authorised to represent clubs and those who are authorised to represent players, a very distinct boundary is drawn.

It is not the intention of this concept to make agents choose who they wish to represent; although I would argue many agents just want to represent players, and those who want to operate as ‘fixers’ just want to represent clubs where commissions may be more lucrative. In fact, there is no reason why a licensed agent can’t be authorised to represent both (albeit not in the same transaction with duality controls). The aim is to enhance transparency and give football authorities the means to more effectively license, monitor and regulate agents based on a more defined role.


5.      Tiered Caps

PROPOSAL

It seems that many have the image of all football agents as wearing shiny suits or designer jeans, big watches and a new range rover for each day of the week …… but whilst that is relatively true of some it is not the case for many.

As such, capping the earning ability of a smaller operator in the agent’s industry can be perceived as hugely unfair, as in some cases the work undertaken by an agent with a player at a lower level can often be far more time consuming, harder work, yet they receive less in commissions (even at times making a loss). If a player does make it to the higher echelons of the game they are often whisked away (often unlawfully) by the bigger agents with no subsequent reward for the agent working with them in their more ‘developmental’ years.

As such, the opinion of many, is that a ‘blanket’ hard cap mechanism (as in the form of that currently proposed by FIFA) effectively restraining (if not penalising) every agent is unfair and ill-conceived. The focus of proposing the cap is purported by FIFA to address the excessive agent commissions, but a large proportion of agent commissions are not excessive and thus FIFAs proposals unfairly treat low agent commissions the same as those earning potentially millions in commissions.

Therefore, the proposal would be to tier a capping mechanism based on the value of a transfer fee or an individuals (player) gross basic salary, depending on the commission received in agent fees (i.e. cumulatively across a transaction) rather than a ‘blanket’ cap across all agent commission.

 In a similar manner to many income tax models around the world, if the agent commissions are above a certain threshold a cap is applied, and as the amount increases the cap changes proportionately (e.g. a cap of 7.5% cap on amounts relating to transfer fees over 2m, 5% on 4m, 3% on 6m, – then 7.5% on amounts relating to a players salary over 2m pa fee, 5% on 4m, 3% on ** NOTE : these are random % and amounts for illustration).

Confused perception that the proposed cap
‘does not limit an agent’s potential earnings’

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The objection to any form of cap (tiered, blanket or otherwise) will be the same as it is with FIFAs current proposal, in that it is arguably illegal and unworkable for a whole raft of reasons; whether it be restraint of trade, human rights, market/price fixing etc etc.

It has been argued by others including FIFA officials that the proposed cap ‘does not limit an agent’s potential earnings’, as an agent can still earn from commercial deals, image rights, legal advice etc (outside of the FIFA cap). This is an assumption that I vehemently disagree with and say is categorically wrong and an ill-informed attitude within FIFA, as many agents do not earn the excessive fees that are regularly highlighted and, in some cases, smaller operators (agents and agencies) often operate on very restrictive budgets and in many cases at a loss.

CONCLUSION

Whilst the agents representing Balon’Dor nominees, internationals, superstar players and those agents who are also lawyers can expect supplemental revenue streams in connection with their client (e.g., image rights, commercial deals, legal advice), the vast majority of agents cannot. As such a ‘blanket cap’ (as currently proposed by FIFA) across all ‘agent service ‘commissions (modest, moderate and excessive) is unfair and disproportionate.

It will arguably (i) reduce representation for those players at the lower end of the game, (ii) remove competition in the agent industry, and (iii) put more power, influence and control in the bigger agents/agencies who many presume are the group FIFA want to address with the cap.

I do believe a tiered cap will meet with less resistance from the football community as a whole (including a large proportion of agents) and added to this it has some foundation in the fact it works in a fairer and more proportionate system in curbing excessive agent commissions (as is FIFAs stated aim and concern) of the few.

Such an implementation would be akin to the tiered taxation systems adopted by many governments around the world in terms of income tax – with bands defining what percentage of tax should be paid above certain amounts. As such a cap is applied on the total commission above a certain amount (or a levy as previously mentioned) could be applied thus limiting the excesses at the higher level, but not penalising those lower down the ‘ladder’. By capping the comparatively excessive fees earned by a so-called ‘super-agent’ earning millions from one deal, as part of a tiered system it still allows for a smaller agent who represents lower-level players to operate without penalty, lower-level players can seek representation, maintains a more competitive agent market, and doesn’t necessarily increase transfer fees or player salaries at the lower level.


6.      Agent Solidarity Mechanism (with built-in levy)

PROPOSAL

A key concern spoken of by FIFA in justifying the need to address excessive agents commissions is the trend that whilst agent commissions have grown, the amount of funds recouped by FIFAs ‘Training Compensation’ and ‘Solidarity Mechanism’ have not grown at the same pace.

Subsequently, I would make the case that this is neither a fair comparison or relevant reason for implementing a hard cap, given that the involvement of agents has developed as the industry has become more complex and evolved, whereas the ‘Solidarity’ and ‘TC’ mechanisms have failed to evolve at the same rate, been impacted by changes in the transfer market and as such penalising agents for the failures in the system where their interests are not aligned, and they can play no part, is not a reasoned argument.

The raising of the ‘Solidarity’ and ‘TC’ in the proposal of a ‘cap’ on agent’s fees has also triggered me to consider a concern that has been spoken of by many agents in the past and may be a basis for another potential ‘hybrid’ solution of those proposals mentioned earlier.

For a considerable amount of time an area of much consternation by agents at the lower level of the game is the matter that whilst they put in a lot of work at the formative stages of client-player careers for little or no reward, this then benefits the larger agents and agencies who take players away from the smaller agents and are arguably in turn the larger agents who receive the excessive fees that FIFA want to address.

Subsequently, by bringing in an agent solidarity mechanism may go some way to (i) both bring more balance to the agent market, (ii) make sure younger and lower-level players receive better representation, (iii) good agents are rewarded and (iv) the possibility of a mechanism that will support the ‘Solidarity’ and ‘TC’ mechanism.

By applying a levy on the commissions received by agents (above a certain levy) that is proportionately paid by all those engaging the services of an agent in a transaction/transfer, this will provide a means of redistributing these funds, not only amongst the clubs who have helped in the development of the player but also the former agents who have also helped in the players development.

‘Training Compensation’ and ‘Solidarity Mechanism’
payments have not grown at the same pace.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The argument could be made that this will increase the ‘farming’ of young players by unscrupulous agents with a view to benefitting on future commissions from such a ‘solidarity’ mechanism, however if supported by clear representation agreements (from FIFA) where the agents obligations are clear, it will encourage proper representation of players throughout their careers and not just when representation is more lucrative.

As mentioned earlier, the addition of a levy on agents fees may well result in increased agents fees, transfer fees and player salaries – but in essence this is a revenue stream that footballs ‘worthier’ causes would otherwise not have.

A hard cap (as proposed by FIFA) is clearly not a welcome proposal by most if not all agents and whilst a solidarity-levy mechanism may also be unwelcome to some it would garner support from a proportion of the agent’s community whose efforts may not otherwise be recognised.

CONCLUSION

Such a solidarity mechanism is a complex and embryonic idea in how it should benefit the various participant groups, and whilst it is a levy placed on agents it is important that it is applied proportionality and

The addition of the FIFA ‘clearing system’ and ‘player passport’ system in managing the payment of agent commissions also eliminates complications that would have otherwise been experienced in the past and thus has stifled the effectiveness of the existing ‘solidarity’ and ‘TC’ mechanisms, whereby clubs may not even be aware that they are due payments, thus proving the said mechanisms have not kept pace with the football industry including the aspect of agent regulation and commissions.

However, I do belief it supports FIFAs key objectives with many of its concerns with regards to agent commissions in (i) addressing the excesses, (ii) protecting minors and younger players, (iii) redistribution (compensation/solidarity) and (iv) improving agent professionalism.


<<<<<< The preceeding article : ‘There are Alternatives to FIFAs Seemingly Doomed 10-3-3 ‘Cap’ on Football Agents Commissions’ – ‘Why do ‘Hardliners’ and Ignorance on Both Sides Risk Sacrificing the ‘Greater Good’ Over a Single Issue?‘ : looked at why the proposed ’10-3-3 Hard Cap’ proposed by FIFA doesn’t match the objectives presented.

https://footballagentblog.chironsportsandmedia.com/2021/12/fifas-doomed-cap-on-football-agents-commissions-hardliner-ingorance-risk/



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